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1 Introduction
The strand of literature on economic growth and climate change contains mostly optimiza-
tion models (see for instance Bosetti et al., 2006; Edenhofer et al., 2005, 2006; Gerlagh
and Van Der Zwaan 2006; Popp, 2006a, 2006b). In these papers, the problem consists in
determining the temporal trajectories which maximize a social welfare function. Generally,
the constraints of the problem are both technological and climatic: in this case, one gets
the first-best optimum. Sometimes, additional constraints are added. For instance, Popp
(2006a) presents the results of a simulated optimal carbon tax without research subsidy.
However, to our knowledge, the basic problem of a policy-maker facing the agent behaviors
in a decentralized economy is generally nor formalized neither analyzed.
There exists several reasons to think that it is impossible to reach the first-best optimum
in the real world. Some of them are standard in the literature, as the existence of ex-ante
distortionnary taxes in the system (Sandmo, 1975), or the restriction to linear taxes. For
instance, Cremer et al. (2001) study how second-best considerations change the level of
the optimal tax on a polluting good, but in a static model. In our paper, we assume
that, because of budgetary, socioeconomic or political constraints, it is difficult to enforce
the first-best policies. For example, consider a policy-maker who is constrained on several
policy tools among the vector of all the instruments he can spare, e.g. the environmental
tax and/or some research subsidies are set below their first-best levels. In these cases, the
policy-maker can only play with the remaining unconstrained tools in order to maximize the
social welfare. The basic point is that the structure of the decentralized economy becomes
an additional constraint for him and then, he can only reach a second-best optimum.
Before conducting a second-best analysis, it is thus necessary to characterize the set of
equilibria: a particular equilibrium is associated to each vector of economic policy tools.
Hence, if some of these tools are constrained, the policy-maker determines the other(s) in
order to maximize the welfare in the remaining sub-set of equilibria.
Beyond the fact that it allows to perform second-best analysis, the general equilibrium
approach has several other advantages. First, it allows to analyze the dissociated impacts
of various policy tools on the time pace of all the variables, prices and quantities. For
instance, one can study the impact of a change in the carbon tax, the other tools being
given. Second, it allows to understand the role of prices, that are the channels by which
policy tools act on the economy. Third, it permits to avoid the inaccuracies inherent in any
partial equilibrium analysis, as for instance the ones implied by the use of the standard
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cost-benefit approach when the policy (or project) choices lead to more than marginal
perturbations (see Dietz et al., 2008, for the special case of climate change mitigation
policies).
The objective of this paper is to propose a methodological framework in order to per-
form second-best analysis in a general equilibrium climate change model with dedicated
endogenous R&D. More precisely, we focus on the study of the set of equilibria in the decen-
tralized economy. The main difficulty of this approach lies in the way the research activity
is modeled, in particular the type of innovation goods which are developed as well as their
pricing. In the standard endogenous growth theory (Aghion and Howitt, 1998; Romer,
1990...), when an innovation is produced, it is associated with a particular intermediate
good. However, the more often, embodying knowledge into intermediate goods becomes
inextricable in more general computable endogenous growth models with pollution and/or
natural resources. In addition, those technical difficulties are emphasized when dealing
with several research sectors, i.e. when there are several types of specific knowledge, each
of them being dedicated to a particular input (resource, labor, capital, backstop...), as it
is proposed in Acemoglu (2002). To circumvent those obstacles, we assume that the pieces
of knowledge are directly priced (see for instance Grimaud and Rougé, 2008). We compute
the social and the market values of an innovation and we suppose that the policy-maker
can reduce the gap between these two values owing to dedicated R&D subsidies.
We develop an endogenous growth model in which energy services can be produced
from a polluting non-renewable resource as well as a clean backstop. We introduce two
R&D sectors, the first one improving the efficiency of energy production, the second one,
the efficiency of the backstop. With this respect, we have to consider two types of market
failures: the pollution from fossil resource use and the research spillovers in each R&D
sector. That is why, in the decentralized equilibrium, we introduce two kinds of economic
policy instruments in accordance: an environmental tax on the carbon emissions and a
research subsidy for the energy and backstop sectors. There is an equilibrium associated
to each vector of instruments, which allows to study the impact of one or several policy
changes on the equilibrium trajectories. Clearly, when public instruments are optimally
set, the equilibrium of the decentralized economy coincides with the first best optimum.
Next, we calibrate the model to fit the world 2005 data. We obtain results that highlight
the role of the research grants, in particular the backstop ones. First, in a second-best
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world, the effect of the green research subsidy on resource extraction, and thus on carbon
emissions, can override the carbon tax one. Second, R&D subsidies have a very large impact
on the total social welfare, as compared with the carbon tax. Third, those subsidies allow
to spare the earlier generations who are, on the other hand, strongly penalized by a carbon
tax.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the decentralized economy and
solves the equilibrium. In section 3, we characterize the first-best optimal solutions and we
compute the optimal policy tools that implement it. In section 4, we analyze a selection of
second-best cases and we illustrate numerically our main results. We conclude in section
5.
2 The decentralized economy
We consider a worldwide decentralized economy containing four production sectors: final
output, energy services and two primary energy inputs, namely a fossil fuel and a carbon-
free backstop. The fossil fuel (e.g. refining industry in the case of oil) is obtained from
a polluting non-renewable resource whose combustion yields carbon emissions which are
accumulated in the atmosphere, implying an increase of the mean atmospheric temperature
and then, some economic penalties. Following on Nordhaus (2007b), we assume here that
these penalties take the form of a damage function affecting the level of final output, instead
of the consumer’s utility. The production of final energy services and backstop requires
some specific knowledges provided by two specific R&D sectors. We assume that all sectors,
except R&D sectors, are perfectly competitive. The population grows exogenously and is
equal to the labor supply. Finally, in order to correct the two types of distortions involved
by the model (pollution and research spillovers in each R&D sector), we introduce two
types of policy tools: an environmental tax on the fossil fuel use and a subsidy for each
R&D sector. The model is sketched in Figure 1 and is detailed sector by sector in the
following subsection.
2.1 Behavior of agents
2.1.1 The final good sector
We assume that global warming affects the economy through the final output such that,
when the average temperature increase is Tt, the instantaneous penalty rate is D(Tt) =
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Figure 1: Description of the model
1/(1 + αTT 2t ), αT > 0. At each time t, the production of final output is D(Tt)Qt, where
Qt is given by:
Qt = Q(Kt, Et, Lt, At) = AtK
γ
t E
β
t L
1−γ−β
t , β, γ ∈ (0, 1), (1)
in which Kt, Et and Lt, Lt ≡ L0e
∫ t
0 gL,sds, denote the capital, the flow of energy services
and the labor employed at time t, respectively. At, At ≡ A0e
∫ t
0 gA,sds, is an efficiency index
that measures the total productivity of factors. Growth rates gL,t and gA,t are exogenously
given: gj,t = gj0e−djt, with dj > 0, ∀j = {A,L}.
Denoting respectively by pE,t, wt, rt and δ the price of energy services, the real wage,
the interest rate and the depreciation rate of capital, and normalizing the output price
to one, the instantaneous profit of the final output producer writes1: ΠQt = D(Tt)Qt −
pE,tEt−wtLt−(rt+δ)Kt. At each time t, the program of the final output producer consists
in choosing Kt, Et and Lt that maximizes Π
Q
t , subject to (1). The first order conditions
1We assume here that the representative household holds the capital and rents it to the firm at a rental
price Rt. Standard arbitrage conditions imply Rt = rt + δ.
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are:
D(Tt)QK − (rt + δ) = 0 (2)
D(Tt)QE − pE,t = 0 (3)
D(Tt)QL − wt = 0, (4)
where JX stands for the partial derivative of function J(.) with respect to X.
2.1.2 The energy sector
The instantaneous production of a flow of energy services, Et, requires a bundle of imperfect
substitute primary energies and some knowledge (see Popp, 2006a):
Et = E(Ft, Bt, HE,t) =
[
(F ρBt +B
ρB
t )
ρH
ρB + αHH
ρH
E,t
] 1
ρH , αH , ρH , ρB ∈ (0, 1), (5)
where Ft is the fossil fuel use, Bt is a backstop energy source and HE,t represents a stock
of specific technological knowledge dedicated to energy efficiency. Denoting by pF,t and
pB,t the prices of fossil fuel and backstop and by τt the carbon tax, assumed here to be
additive, the energy producer must chooses Ft and Bt at each time t that maximizes
ΠEt = pE,tEt− (pF,t + τt)Ft− pB,tBt, subject to (5). Note that, because of the carbon tax,
the fuel price paid by the firm, i.e. pF,t + τt, is larger than the selling price pF,t, i.e. the
price which is received by the resource-holder. The first order conditions write:
pE,tEF − pF,t − τt = 0 (6)
pE,tEB − pB,t = 0. (7)
2.1.3 The fossil fuel sector
The fossil fuel is obtained from some carbon-based non-renewable resource and some spe-
cific productive investment (see Grimaud et al., 2007):
Ft = F (QF,t, Zt) =
QF,t
cF + αF (Zt/Z¯)ηF
, cF , αF , ηF > 0, (8)
where QF,t is the amount of final product devoted to the production of fossil fuel and
Zt, Zt ≡
∫ t
0 Fsds, is the cumulative extraction of the exhaustible resource from the initial
date up to t, with Z¯: Zt ≤ Z¯, ∀t ≥ 0. Then, the fuel supply is constrained by the
resource scarcity. The instantaneous profit of the fuel producer is: ΠFt = pF,tFt − QF,t
and its program consists in choosing {QF,t}∞0 that maximizes
∫∞
0 Π
F
t e
− ∫ t0 rsdsdt, subject
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to Zt =
∫ t
0 Fsds and (8). Denoting by ηt the multiplier associated with the state equation,
static and dynamic first order conditions are:
(pF,tFQF − 1)e−
∫ t
0 rsds + ηtFQF = 0 (9)
pF,tFZe
− ∫ t0 rsds + ηtFZ = −η˙t, (10)
together with the transversality condition limt→∞ ηtZt = 0. Integrating (10) and using
(9), it comes:
pF,t =
1
FQF
−
∫ ∞
t
FZ
FQF
e−
∫ s
t rxdxds, (11)
which reads as a specific version of the standard Hotelling rule in the case of an extraction
technology given by function (8).
2.1.4 The backstop sector
The backstop resource technology is given by:
Bt = B(QB,t, HB,t) = αBQB,tH
ηB
B,t, αB, ηB > 0, (12)
where QB,t is the amount of final product that is devoted to the backstop production
sector and HB,t is the stock of knowledge pertaining to the backstop. At each time t,
the backstop producer maximizes its profit ΠBt = [pB,tBt −QB,t], subject to technological
constraint (12), which implies the following first order condition:
pB,tBQB − 1 = 0. (13)
2.1.5 The R&D sectors
There are two stocks of knowledge, HE and HB, each associated with a specific R&D sector
(i.e. the energy and the backstop ones). We consider that each innovation is a non-rival,
indivisible and infinitely durable piece of knowledge (for instance, a scientific report, a data
base, a software algorithm...) which is simultaneously used by the sector which produces
the good i and the R&D sector i, i = {B,E}.
Here, an innovation is not directly embodied into tangible intermediate goods and thus,
it cannot be financed by the sale of these goods. However, in order to fully describe the
equilibrium, we need to find a way to assess the price received by the inventor for each
piece of knowledge. We proceed as follows: i) In each research sector, we determine the
social value of an innovation. Since an innovation is a public good, this social value is the
sum of marginal profitabilities of this innovation in all sectors which use it. If the inventor
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was able to extract the willingness to pay of each user, he would receive this social value
and the first best optimum would be implemented. ii) In reality, there are some distortions
that constrain the inventor to extract only a part of this social value2. This implies that
the market value (without subsidy) is lower than the social one. iii) The research sectors
are eventually subsidized in order to reduce the gap between the social and the market
values of innovations.
Let us apply this three-steps procedure to the R&D sector i, i = {B,E}. Each in-
novation produced by this sector is used by the R&D sector i itself as well as by the
production technology of good i. Thus, at each date t, the instantaneous social value of
this innovation is v¯Hi,t = v¯iHi,t + v¯
Hi
Hi,t
, where v¯iHi,t and v¯
Hi
Hi,t
are the marginal profitabilities
of this innovation in the production and R&D sectors i, respectively. The social value of
this innovation at t is V¯Hi,t =
∫∞
t v¯Hi,se
− ∫ st rxdxds. We assume that, without any public
intervention, only a share γi of the social value is paid to the innovator, with 0 < γi < 1.
However, the government can decide to grant this R&D sector by applying a non-negative
subsidy rate σi,t. Note that if σi,t = 1− γi, the market value matches the social one. The
instantaneous market value (including subsidy) is:
vHi,t = (γi + σi,t)v¯Hi,t, (14)
and the market value at date t is:
VHi,t =
∫ ∞
t
vHi,se
− ∫ st rxdxds. (15)
Note that differentiating (15) with respect to time leads to the usual arbitrage relation:
rt =
V˙Hi,t
VHi,t
+
vHi,t
VHi,t
, ∀i = {B,E} , (16)
which reads as the equality between the rate of return on the financial market and the rate
of return on the R&D sector i.
We can now analyze the behaviors of the R&D sectors. The dynamics of the stock of
knowledge in sector i is governed by the following innovation function H i(.):
H˙i,t = H i(Ri,t, Hi,t) = aiRbii,tH
φi
i,t , (17)
where ai > 0, and bi, φi ∈ [0, 1], ∀i = {B,E}. Ri,t is the R&D investment into sector i,
i.e. the amount of final output that is devoted to R&D sector i. At each time t, each
2For instance, Jones and Williams, 1998, estimate that actual investment in research are at least four
times below what would be socially optimal; on this point, see also Popp, 2006a.
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sector i, i = {B,E}, supplies the flow of innovations H˙i,t at price VHi,t and demands
some specific investment Ri,t at price 1, so that the profit function to be maximized is
ΠHit = VHi,tH
i(Ri,t, Hi,t)−Ri,t. The first order condition implies:
∂ΠHit
∂Ri,t
= 0 ⇒ VHi,t =
1
H iRi
. (18)
The marginal profitability for specific knowledge of R&D sector i is:
v¯HiHi,t =
∂ΠHit
∂Hi,t
= VHi,tH
i
Hi =
H iHi
H iRi
. (19)
Finally, in order to determine the social and the market values of an innovation in all
research sectors, we need to know the marginal profitabilities of innovations in the back-
stop and the energy production sectors. From the expressions of ΠBt and ΠEt , those values
are given respectively by v¯BHB ,t = ∂Π
B
t /∂HB,t = BHB/BQB and v¯
E
HE ,t
= ∂ΠEt /∂HE,t =
EHE/EBBQB . Therefore, the instantaneous market values (including subsidies) of innova-
tions are:
vHB ,t = (γB + σB,t)
(
BHB
BQB
+
HBHB
HBRB
)
(20)
vHE ,t = (γE + σE,t)
(
EHE
EBBQB
+
HEHE
HERE
)
. (21)
2.1.6 The household and the government
The social welfare function is defined as:
W =
∫ ∞
0
U(Ct)e−
∫ t
0 ρsdsdt = v1
∫ ∞
0
Lt
(Ct/Lt)1−
(1− ) e
− ∫ t0 ρsdsdt+ v2, (22)
where ρt, ρt ≡ ρ0e−gρt, is the instantaneous social rate of time preferences, gρ, gρ > 0, is
the (constant) declining rate of ρt, U(Ct) is the instantaneous utility function, ,  > 0, is
the elasticity of marginal utility, and v1, v2 > 0 are scaling parameters. The households
maximize W subject to the following dynamic budget constraint:
K˙t = rKt + wtLt + Πt − Ct − T at , (23)
where Πt is the total profits gained in the economy and T at is a lump-sum tax (subsidy-free)
that allows to balance the budget constraint of the government. This maximization leads
to the following condition:
ρt − U˙
′(Ct)
U ′(Ct)
= rt ⇒ U ′(Ct) = U ′(C0)e
∫ t
0 (ρs−rs)ds. (24)
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Assuming that the government’s budget constraint holds at each time t (i.e. sum of
the various taxes equal R&D subsidies), then it writes:
T at + τtFt =
∑
i
σi
(γi + σi)
VHi,tH˙i,t, i = {B,E} . (25)
Finally, remark that expanding Πt = Π
Q
t + Π
E
t + Π
B
t + Π
F
t + Π
HB
t + Π
HE
t into (23) and
replacing T at by its value coming from (25), we obtain:
D(Tt)Qt = Ct +QF,t +QB,t + It +RE,t +RB,t, (26)
where It is the instantaneous investment in capital defined by:
It = K˙t + δKt. (27)
Hence, we verify that the final output is devoted to the aggregated consumption, the fossil
fuel production, the backstop production, the investment in capital, and in the two R&D
sectors.
2.2 The environment
Pollution is generated by fossil fuel burning. Let ξ, ξ > 0, be the unitary carbon content
of fossil fuel, G0 the stock of carbon in the atmosphere at the beginning of the planning
period, Gt the stock at time t and ζ, ζ > 0, the natural rate of decay. As in the DICE-07
model (Nordhaus, 2007b), the atmospheric carbon concentration does not directly enter
the damage function. In fact, the increase in carbon concentration drives the global mean
temperature away from a given state – here the 1900 level – and the difference between this
state and the present global mean temperature is taken as an index of climate change. Let
Tt denote this difference. Then, the climatic dynamic system is captured by the following
two state equations:
G˙t = ξFt − ζGt (28)
T˙t = Φ(Gt)−mTt = αG logGt −mTt, αG,m > 0. (29)
Function Φ(.), which links the atmospheric carbon concentration to the dynamics of tem-
perature, is in fact the reduced form of a more complex function that takes into account
the inertia of the climate dynamics (i.e. the radiative forcing, see Nordhaus 2007b)3.
3In the analytical treatment of the model, we assume, for the sake of clarity, that the carbon cycle
through atmosphere and oceans as well as the dynamic interactions between atmospheric and oceanic
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2.3 Characterization of the decentralized equilibrium
From the previous analysis of individual behaviors, we can now characterize an equilibrium
in the decentralized economy, which is done by the following proposition:
Proposition 1 For a given triplet of policies {σB,t, σE,t, τt}∞t=0, the equilibrium conditions
can be summed up as follows:[
D(Tt)QEEF − τt − 1
FQF
]
U ′(Ct)e−
∫ t
0 ρsds +
∫ ∞
t
FZ
FQF
U ′(Cs)e−
∫ s
0 ρxdxds = 0 (30)
D(Tt)QEEBBQB = 1 (31)
D(Tt)QK − δ = ρt − U˙
′(Ct)
U ′(Ct)
(32)
−H˙
B
RB
HBRB
+ (γB + σB,t)
(
BHBH
B
RB
BQB
+HBHB
)
= ρt − U˙
′(Ct)
U ′(Ct)
(33)
−H˙
E
RE
HERE
+ (γE + σE,t)
(
EHEH
E
RE
EBBQB
+HEHE
)
= ρt − U˙
′(Ct)
U ′(Ct)
. (34)
The corresponding system of prices is:
r∗t = D(Tt)QK − δ (35)
w∗t = D(Tt)QL (36)
p∗F,t =
1
FQF
−
∫ ∞
t
FZ
FQF
e−
∫ s
t rxdxds (37)
p∗B,t =
1
BQB
(38)
p∗E,t =
p∗B,t
EB
= D(Tt)QE (39)
V ∗Hi,t =
1
H iRi
, ∀i = {B,E} . (40)
Proof. See Appendix A1.
A particular equilibrium is associated with a given triplet of policies {σB,t, σE,t, τt}∞t=0
and the set of equations given by Proposition 1 allows to compute quantities and prices for
this equilibrium. If the triplet of policy tools is optimal, this set of equations characterizes
temperatures, are captured by the reduced form (28) and (29). Goulder and Mathai (2000), or Kriegler
and Bruckner (2004), have recourse to such simplified dynamics. From the DICE-99 model, the formers
estimate parameters ξ and ζ that take into account the inertia of the climatic system. They state that
only 64% of current emissions actually contribute to the augmentation of atmospheric CO2 and that the
portion of current CO2 concentration in excess is removed naturally at a rate of 0.8% per year. However,
in the numerical simulations, we adopt the full characterization of the climate dynamics from the 2007
version of DICE (see http://nordhaus.econ.yale.edu/).
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the first-best optimum, together with the system of prices that implement it. Note that
we will get the same kind of conditions than the ones of Proposition 1 to characterize the
first-best optimum (cf. Proposition 2 below), so that we defer their interpretations to the
next section.
3 Implementation of the first-best optimum
The social planner problem consists in choosing {Ct, QB,t, QF,t, RB,t, RE,t}∞t=0 that max-
imizes W , as defined by (22), subject to the output allocation constraint (26), the tech-
nological constraints (1), (5), (8) and (12), the environmental constraints (28) and (29),
and, finally, the stock accumulation constraints (17), (27) and Z˙t = Ft. After eliminating
the co-state variables, the first order conditions reduce to the five characteristic conditions
of Proposition 2 below, which hold at each time t (we drop time subscripts for notational
convenience).
Proposition 2 At each time t, an optimal solution is characterized by the following five
conditions:[
D(T )QEEF − 1
FQF
]
U ′(C)e−
∫ t
0 ρds +
∫ ∞
t
FZ
FQF
U ′(C)e−
∫ s
0 ρdxds
+ξ
∫ ∞
t
[∫ ∞
s
D′(T )QU ′(C)e−
∫ x
0 ρdy−m(x−s)dx
]
Φ′(G)e−ζ(s−t)ds = 0 (41)
D(Tt)QEEBBQB = 1 (42)
D(T )QK − δ = ρ− U˙
′(C)
U ′(C)
(43)
HBHB +
HBRBBHB
BQB
− H˙
B
RB
HBRB
= ρ− U˙
′(C)
U ′(C)
(44)
HEHE +
HEREEHE
EBBQB
− H˙
E
RE
HERE
= ρ− U˙
′(C)
U ′(C)
. (45)
Proof. See Appendix A2.
Equation (41) reads as a particular version of the Hotelling rule in this model, which
takes into account the carbon accumulation in the atmosphere, the dynamics of temper-
atures and their effects on output. Equation (42) tells that the marginal productivity of
specific input QB,t equals its marginal cost. The three last equations are Keynes-Ramsey
conditions. Equation (43) characterizes the optimal trade-off between capital Kt and con-
sumption Ct, as in more standard growth models. Equation (44) (resp. (45)) characterizes
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the same kind of optimal trade-off between specific investment into backstop R&D sector,
RB,t (resp. energy R&D sector, RE,t) and consumption.
Recall that for a given set of public policies, a particular equilibrium is characterized by
conditions (30)-(34) of Proposition 1. This equilibrium will be said to be optimal if it satis-
fies the optimum characterizing conditions (41)-(45) of Proposition 2. By analogy between
these two sets of conditions, we can show that there exists a single triplet {σB,t, σE,t, τt}∞t=0
that implements the optimum.
First, by comparing conditions (30) and (41), the optimal pollution tax can be identified
as:
τ ot = −
ξ
U ′(C)
{∫ ∞
t
[∫ ∞
s
D′(T )QU ′(C)e−m(x−s)−
∫ x
t ρdydx
]
Φ′(G)e−ζ(s−t)ds
}
. (46)
This expression reads as the ratio between the marginal social cost of climate change –
the marginal damage in terms of utility coming from the consumption of an additional
unit of fossil resource – and the marginal utility of consumption. In other words, it is the
environmental cost of one unit of fossil resource in terms of final good.
Next, the correspondence between the equilibrium characterizing condition (33) (resp.
(34)) and the optimum characterizing condition (44) (resp. (45)) is achieved if and only if
σi,t is equal to 1−γi, i = {B,E}, i.e. if the two sectors are fully subsidized. The remaining
conditions of the two sets are equivalent. These findings are summarized in Proposition 3
below.
Proposition 3 The equilibrium defined in Proposition 1 is optimal if and only if the triplet
of policies {σB,t, σE,t, τt}∞t=0 is such that σB,t = 1− γB, σE,t = 1− γE and τt = τ ot , for all
t ≥ 0.
4 Second-best policies
4.1 Methodology
The characteristic conditions of Proposition 1 yield the intertemporal equilibrium profiles
of quantities {Cet , T et , F et , ...}∞0 and prices
{
peF,t, p
e
B,t, ...
}∞
0
associated with any profile of
policy tools {τt, σB,t, σB,t}∞0 . For each equilibrium solution, one can compute the associ-
ated welfare value as a function of those public tools: W
({τt, σB,t, σB,t}∞0 ). When W is
maximized simultaneously with respect to the three tools, one gets the first-best optimum
as described by Proposition 3.
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Assume now that the social planner faces some constraints on her choices. For instance,
she cannot subsidy research, or she cannot implement the first-best carbon tax. In this
case, she only uses the remaining unconstrained tool(s) to maximize the social welfare in
the remaining sub-set of equilibria. Among the infinity of possible second-best problems,
we focus on the particular cases described in Table 1.
Case τt σE σB Comment
FB τ ot σ
o
E σ
o
B First-best optimum
LF 0 0 0 Laisser-faire
SB1 τ sb1t 0 0 Second-best, no R&D subs.
SB2 τ sb2t σ
o
E 0 Second-best, no green R&D subs.
SB3 τ sb3t 0 σ
o
B Second-best, no energy R&D subs.
SB4 0 σsbE σ
sb
B Second-best, no carbon tax
Table 1: Summary of the various cases
In table 1, polar cases "FB" and "LF" refer to the first-best and the laisser-faire,
respectively. All the other cases are second-best analysis. "SB1" is the case where neither
energy nor backstop R&D can be subsidized and it gives the associated second-best carbon
tax τ sb1t . "SB2" (resp. "SB3") is the case where the green (resp. energy) research cannot
be granted, the other subsidy been set at its first-best optimal level; the associated second-
best tax is denoted by τ sb2t (resp. τ sb3t ). The first and second-best carbon taxes are depicted
in Figure 2(a). Finally, "SB4" is the case where the fossil resource is not taxed at all. It
gives the associated second-best R&D subsidies, given the additional constraints that those
subsidies are equal and constant over time. Under these simplifying assumptions, we find
σsbi = 1.04× σoi , i = {B,E}.
4.2 Main results
As shown in figure 2(a), when the social planner is not able to grant research at all, then
she must impose a higher carbon tax than the first-best one: τ ot < τ sb1t . In order to identify
the relevant research sector to explain this result, we must look at "SB2" and "SB3". It
appears that only green R&D matters. Then, under an economic policy point of view, an
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insufficient σB can be partially balanced by an increase in τ , but not an insufficient σE .
To sum up, one gets:
τ lf = τ sb4 = 0 < τ ot ≈ τ sb3t < τ sb1t ≈ τ sb2t , ∀t ≥ 0.
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Figure 2: Results in resources and pollution
This ranking of the various taxes is transfered to the fossil fuel market prices, i.e. the
selling prices including tax, as shown in Figure 2(b):
plfF,t ≈ psb4F,t < poF,t ≈ psb3F,t < psb1F,t ≈ psb2F,t , ∀t ≥ 0.
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We could expect that this ranking of taxes and fossil prices would lead to a correspond-
ing inverted ranking of the extraction trajectories. However, we can see in Figure 2(c) that
this not the case. Indeed, we have (at least until the end of this century):
F lft ≈ F sb4t > F sb1t ≈ F sb2t > F ot ≈ F sb3t , ∀t ≥ 0.
The first inequality is the expected one: an increase in τ causes F to decrease. On the other
hand, more surprising is the second one. As compared to "FB", the carbon tax increases in
"SB1" and "SB2", but the fossil fuel extraction flow also increases. The reason is that the
green R&D subsidy, σB, decreases: the effect of the green research subsidy overrides the
carbon tax one. The same results prevail when we look at the carbon accumulation in the
atmosphere (Figure 2(d)) and the variations of temperatures (not shown). Those results
illustrates the role that green research subsidies can play in climate change mitigation
policies.
From Figures 2(e) and 2(f), we observe that the carbon tax has only very weak effect
on the backstop price and production, and on the green R&D (not shown). The basic
relevant policy tool on these markets is the specific subsidy σB.
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Figure 3: Macroeconomic impacts
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Figure 3 focuses on more general macroeconomic effects of the various scenarios. Figure
3 (a) depicts the variations in percents of the final output, formally (1 − D)/D. Unsur-
prisingly, the results directly follow the variations of carbon accumulation and thus of
temperatures analyzed above.
In Figure 3(b), we analyze the losses and gains in terms of final output, and thus in
terms of instantaneous utility, implied by the various public interventions, as compared
with the laisser-faire case. First, whatever the case in which a carbon tax is set up, we
can observe a loss for the earlier generations. Second, the larger the carbon tax is, the
stronger this loss. Third, one can attenuate the loss caused by the carbon tax and reach
earlier the date at which gains will occur again, by increasing simultaneously the green
research subsidy. Finally, the intergenerational effort can be smoothed if the planner uses
less the tax and more the subsidy. However, in this case, the long run gain reveals to be
less important than the one implied by the use of the carbon tax alone.
Last, Figure 3(c) gives some results on the relative impacts of both the carbon tax and
the R&D subsidies on the social welfare (i.e. the present value of the flows of instantaneous
utility). For instance, the gap between "FB" and "LF" highlights the social cost of doing
nothing. Similarly, the gap between "FB" and "SB1" (resp. "SB4") measures the social
cost when research sectors are not subsidized at all (resp. when the fossil resource is not
taxed). It is then notable to observe that R&D subsidies have a very large impact on the
total social welfare, as compared with the carbon tax. Moreover, as shown in Figure 3(b)
(cf. "SB4" curve), those subsidies allow to spare the earlier generations who are, on the
other hand, strongly penalized by a carbon tax.
5 Conclusion
We have conducted various second-best analysis in a general equilibrium climate change
model with endogenous and dedicated R&D. To do that, we have characterized the set of
equilibria in the decentralized economy, and we have imposed some institutional constraints
on the policy tool(s): i) the impossibility to implement the first-best carbon tax; ii) the
impossibility to subsidize one or two R&D sectors. In each case, we have computed the
second-best level of the remaining unconstrained tool(s). The second-best results have
been compared with, on the upper side, the first-best trajectories and, on the lower side,
the laisser-faire ones. Those comparisons have allowed to appreciate the effects of each
policy tool on the trajectories of the main following variables: fossil fuel extraction and
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price, backstop use and price, atmospheric carbon concentration, instantaneous damage,
final output. We have also illustrated the assessment of each tool in terms of social welfare
gain with respect to the laisser-faire benchmark case.
The main results have highlighted the role of the research grants, in particular the
backstop ones. First, in a second-best world, the effect of the green research subsidy
on resource extraction, and thus on the flow of pollution, has proved to counter-balance
the carbon tax one. Second, R&D subsidies have a very large impact on the total social
welfare, as compared with the carbon tax. Third, those subsidies allow to spare the earlier
generations who are, on the other hand, strongly penalized by a carbon tax.
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Appendix
A1. Proof of Proposition 1
The first characterizing condition (30) is obtained by replacing η into (9) by its value
η0 −
∫ t
0
[
FZ/FQF exp
(− ∫ s0 rdu)] ds and by noting that pF = pEEF − τ from (6), where
pE = D(T )QE from (3) and exp(−
∫ t
0 rds) = U
′(C) exp(− ∫ t0 ρds) from (24). Combining
(3), (7) and (13) leads to condition (31). Next, using (2) and (24), we directly get condition
(32). Finally, the differentiation of (18) with respect to time leads to:
V˙Hi
VHi
= −H˙
i
Ri
H iRi
, i = {B,E} .
Substituting this expression into (16) and using (14), (18) and (19), it comes:
r = −H˙
i
Ri
H iRi
+ (σi + γi)H iRi
(
v¯iHi +
H iHi
H iRi
)
, ∀i = {B,E, S} .
We obtain the two last characterizing equilibrium conditions (33) and (34) by replacing
into this last equation v¯BHB and v¯
E
HE
by their expressions.
A2. Proof of Proposition 2
Let H be the discounted value of the Hamiltonian of the optimal program:
H = U(C)e−
∫ t
0 ρds + λD(T )Q {K,E [F (QF , Z), B(QB, HB), HE ]}
−λ
(
C +QF +QB + δK +
∑
i
Ri
)
+
∑
i
νiH
i(Ri, Hi)
+µG [ξF (QF , Z)− ζG] + µT [Φ(G)−mT ] + ηF (QF , Z).
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The associated first order conditions are:
∂H
∂C
= U ′(C)e−
∫ t
0 ρds − λ = 0 (47)
∂H
∂QF
= λ[D(T )QEEFFQF − 1] + ξµGFQF + ηFQF = 0 (48)
∂H
∂QB
= λ[D(T )QEEBBQB − 1] = 0 (49)
∂H
∂Ri
= −λ+ νiH iRi = 0, i = {B,E} (50)
∂H
∂K
= λ[D(T )QK − δ] = −λ˙ (51)
∂H
∂HB
= λD(T )QEEBBHB + νBH
B
HB
= −ν˙B (52)
∂H
∂HE
= λD(T )QEEHE + νEH
E
HE
= −ν˙E (53)
∂H
∂G
= −ζµG + µTΦ′(G) = −µ˙G (54)
∂H
∂T
= λD′(T )Q−mµT = −µ˙T (55)
∂H
∂Z
= λD(T )QEEFFZ + ξµGFZ + ηFZ = −η˙ (56)
The transversality conditions are:
lim
t→∞λK = 0 (57)
lim
t→∞ νiHi = 0, i = {B,E} (58)
lim
t→∞µGG = 0 (59)
lim
t→∞µTT = 0 (60)
lim
t→∞ ηZ = 0 (61)
First, from (47), (48) and (56), we can write the following differential equation:
η˙ = − FZ
FQF
U ′(C)e−
∫ t
0 ρds.
Integrating this expression and using transversality condition (61), we obtain:
η =
∫ ∞
t
FZ
FQF
U ′(C)e−
∫ s
0 ρduds. (62)
From (47) and (55), we have:
µ˙T = mµT −D′(T )QU ′(C)e−
∫ t
0 ρds.
Using (60), the solution of such a differential equation can be computed as:
µT =
∫ ∞
t
D′(T )QU ′(C)e−[m(s−t)+
∫ s
0 ρdx]ds. (63)
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Equations (54) and (59) imply:
µG =
∫ ∞
t
µTΦ′(G)e−ζ(s−t)ds. (64)
Replacing into (48) λ, η, µT and µG by their expressions coming from (47), (62), (63) and
(64), respectively, gives us the equation (41) of Proposition 1.
Second, equation (43) directly comes from condition (49). Next, log-differentiating (47)
and (50) with respect to time yields:
λ˙
λ
=
U˙ ′(C)
U ′(C)
− ρ (65)
λ˙
λ
=
ν˙i
νi
+
H˙ iRi
H iRi
. (66)
Combining (65) and (51) yields condition (43). Condition (44) comes from (50), (52),
(65) and (66), and from (49) by using D(T )QEEB = 1/BQB . Similarly, conditions (45) is
obtained from the equations (50), (53), (65) and (66).
A3. Calibration of the model
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Param. Value Description Source
γ 0.3 Capital elasticity in output prod. Nordhaus (2007b)
β 0.07029 Energy elasticity in output prod. Nordhaus (2007b)
αT 0.0028388 Scaling param. on damage Nordhaus (2007b)
ρB Elasticity of subs. for backstop Calibrated
ρE 0.38 Elasticity of subs. for energy Popp (2006a)
αH 0.336 Scaling param. of HE on energy Popp (2006a)
F0 7.401 2005 fossil fuel use in GtC IEA (2007)
cF 345 2005 fossil fuel price in USD Computed from IEA (2007)
αF 700 Scaling param. on fossil fuel cost Popp (2006a)
ηF 4 Exponent in fossil fuel prod. Popp (2006a)
B0 0.55 2005 backstop use in GtC IEA (2007)
αB 1035 2005 backstop price in USD Nordhaus (2007b)
ηB Exponent in backstop prod. Calibrated
aB 0.0122 Scaling param. in backstop innovation Popp (2006a)
aE 0.0264 Scaling param. in energy innovation Popp (2006a)
bB 0.3 Rate of return of backstop R&D Popp (2006a)
bE 0.2 Rate of return of energy R&D Popp (2006a)
Φi 0.54 Elasticity of knowledge in innovation Popp (2006a)
 2 Elasticity of intertemporal subst. Nordhaus (2007b)
At Total factor productivity trend Nordhaus (2007b)
Lt World population trend Nordhaus (2007b)
ρt Time preference rate Nordhaus (2007b)
Other param. and initial values Calibrated
Table 2: Calibration of parameters
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